Full Text : NSIB Speaks on Train Derailment

Press Release
Date: 29 August 2025
Location: Abuja, Nigeria
Train Derailment at Asham Train Station
On 26 August 2025 at approximately 11:07 hours, a passenger train operating the Abuja–Kaduna service (AK1), registration CDD5C2 2701, derailed at Asham Train Station on the Abuja–Kaduna rail line. The train was operated by the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC).
The train consisted of eight passenger coaches with one locomotive at the front and one at the rear. It departed Idu Station, Abuja, at 09:45 hours and stopped at Kubwa Station at 10:04 hours before continuing its journey. Shortly after passing a track changing point (switch/turnout) at Asham Station, five coaches (SC00 6T, SC00 8T, SC00 10T, E00 2S, and EB00 2S) derailed. The forward locomotive (CDD5C2 2701) and two coaches (SC002T, SC004T) overturned, while the rear locomotive (CDD5C1 W0004) and the last coach (SE00 2S) remained on the rail track.
There were 583 persons on board, including crew. An eyewitness reported that approximately 50 passengers may have been injured, though many were taken away by their families. Official records confirmed 12 person sustain minor to moderate injuries. No fatalities recorded. The injured received first aid treatment and were transported to medical facilities for further examination. The NRC emergency team, supported by station military personnel and other security agencies, secured the site.
The derailment resulted in significant damage to the track, sleepers, and switching mechanism. Services on the Abuja–Kaduna–Abuja corridor were temporarily suspended to allow for recovery and repairs.

Accident Investigation Process
In accordance with the Railways (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Regulation 2024, established under the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) (Establishment) Act 2022, the NSIB has been notified and has instituted an independent investigation into this railway occurrence. The NSIB, as Nigeria’s designated Accident Investigation Authority (the “Bureau”), is responsible for conducting investigations into railway accidents and incidents with the primary objective of preventing future occurrences. This process focuses on gathering and analysing information, determining causes and contributing factors (such as actions, omissions, events, or conditions that led to or increased the probability of the derailment), and issuing safety recommendations. The identification of causes or contributing factors does not imply assignment of fault, blame, or liability (administrative, civil, or criminal).
The investigation is conducted independently of any judicial, administrative, or other proceedings, ensuring impartiality. Upon notification of the accident by the NRC (as required under Part 4 of the Regulation, including details such as the date, time, location, type of occurrence, and initial consequences), the NSIB has appointed an Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) based on qualifications to organise, conduct, and control the investigation. The IIC has full access and control over the accident site, evidence, and relevant records, including the protection and custody of rolling stock, locomotives, contents, and other evidence to prevent disturbance or tampering.
Evidence protection measures include securing the site, restricting access, and coordinating with railway security authorities, police, and other relevant entities. Recorded data from the train, including vigilance control systems, speedometers, on-board CCTV cameras, and over-speed trip mechanisms, will be preserved and analysed. The NSIB may appoint technical experts to assist the IIC and may delegate parts of the investigation if needed, while ensuring coordination with any judicial panel or tribunal of inquiry.
The ongoing investigation, as outlined in Part 5 of the Regulation, includes:

1. Detailed inspection of the site, switch, track geometry, and infrastructure.
2. Review of NRC records (crew, station, control, maintenance, and operational data).
3. Technical examination of locomotives, coaches, and other rolling stock.
4. Interviews with crew, staff, responders, passengers, and witnesses (with statements taken under affirmation where required).
5. Correlation of all evidence, including organisational information from the operator, to determine causal and contributing factors.
6. Analysis of any recorded data from accidents and incidents, ensuring protection of investigation records from unauthorised disclosure or use in judicial proceedings (subject to a balancing test by competent authorities like the Federal High Court).
7. Potential reopening of the investigation if new evidence emerges, and release of established factual information within the first year if appropriate.
   If the investigation identifies international aspects (e.g., involvement of foreign states in design, manufacture, or operation of the rolling stock), the NSIB will forward notifications to relevant States and may invite accredited representatives or advisers to participate, respecting their rights and obligations. Family assistance will be provided in line with Part 9, including coordination with providers such as government agencies, the NRC, and family associations to address the needs of victims, survivors, and their families (defined as spouses, children, parents, siblings, and grandparents). A coordinator may be appointed to ensure accurate information and support.
   Upon completion, a Draft Final Report will be prepared, which will include factual information, analysis, conclusions, and safety recommendations. This draft will be shared for consultation with stakeholders (including the NRC, other states, and interested parties) to solicit significant and substantiated comments. The Final Report will then be released by the Director-General of the NSIB to recipients, including the Minister for Transport, the operator, and international bodies if applicable, and made publicly available. Interim statements may be issued on the anniversaries of the accident to update progress and highlight any ongoing safety issues.
   Safety recommendations, which may arise from this investigation or other sources, such as safety studies, will be communicated to relevant parties (e.g., the NRC or regulatory bodies) to prevent similar incidents in the future. Progress on these recommendations will be closely monitored, and enhancements to safety data collection and processing systems (SDCPS) may be implemented, incorporating both mandatory and voluntary reporting mechanisms. Preliminary Reports and Accident Data Reports will be forwarded as required for intercity passenger trains, such as AK1.  
   Conclusion
   The derailment of train AK1 at Asham Station on 26 August 2025 caused injuries to passengers, damage to railway infrastructure, and disruption of services along the Abuja–Kaduna corridor. While emergency response and evacuation efforts were effectively managed, the occurrence underscores the importance of a comprehensive, independent safety investigation under the NSIB Regulation. Findings from the ongoing investigation will inform the development of safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences and enhancing railway safety in Nigeria. The NSIB is committed to transparency, with further updates issued as new information becomes available, including any interim statements or the Final Report.